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Abstract
We run a computerised experiment of network formation, where all
connections are benecial and only direct links are costly. The game-
theoretic basis for the experiment is the model of Goyal and Joshi (2004)
where players simultaneously submit link proposals and a connection is
made only when both players involved agree. We provide an analysis
both at the macro and the micro level. From a macro perspective, in
accordance with the exsisting literature, we nd that convergence to the
stable network architecture is made problematic by the presence of multi-
ple equilibria. At the level of the individual, we estimate the probability
of a link through a probit model that includes both best-response and
behavioural variables. We nd strong evidence that both play a role in
network formation.
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1 Introduction
The role of social networks in shaping economic outcomes has received increasing
attention in recent years. Network externalities have been extensively studied
both in industrial organisations and, more recently, within the theory of social
capital and development economics. Most of this literature however takes the
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structure of the social network as given and analyses the consequences of network
externalities on outcomes.
In this paper we take the view that social linkages are often voluntarily
formed and hence the architecture and membership of social networks are part
of the economic outcome that one aims to explain. The literature on endoge-
nous network formation stems from two seminal contributions by Jackson and
Wolinsky [19] and Bala and Goyal [1]. Both papers follow a game-theoretic
approach to the formation of social ties where the main idea is that players earn
benets from being connected both directly and indirectly to other players and
bear costs for maintaining direct links.
The process of forming a network is extremely complex. The main di¤erence
between a network and a series of bilateral interactions lies in the value that
accrues to agents though indirect connections: any two economic agents who
have to decide whether to establish a social tie take into account not only their
own characteristics and the characteristics of the prospective partner, but also
the position of the prospective partner in the social network.
Given that the process of network formation is so complex, predicted out-
comes are typically not unique. Even for those cases where the stable network
architecture is unique (for example, the star network in information communi-
cation models a la Bala and Goyal or Jackson and Wolinsky), the coordination
problem of which agent occupies which position in the network still remains.
In presence of multiplicity of equilibria, agents playing simultaneously face
strategic uncertainty. The way in which agents cope with such uncertainty
might result in some network architectures being more likely to achieve than
others. We believe that interesting questions to address from an experimental
perspective are the following: are there network congurations which are more
likely to be achieved?; within such architecture, which role is played by which
agent?; do subjects play best response strategies or do they also condition their
actions on elements which do not a¤ect directly their payo¤s but help towards
coordination?
The few existing experimental works on this topic have all highlighted the
di¢ culty in obtaining convergence to a stable network architecture as predicted
by the theory. More in detail, convergence is problematic in those framework
where the prediction for the stable network is the center-sponsored star (Falk
and Kosfeld [13], Berninghaus et al [3]); in those settings where the stable net-
work architecture is the wheel convergence is more easily achieved (Callander
and Plott [4], and Falk and Kosfeld [13]). Falk and Kosfeld [13] and Berninghaus
et al [3] highlight the role of complexity and inequality aversion in preventing
convergence to network architectures that are not "fairness compatible": they
argue that a network architecture, such as the star network, which results in
an uneven distribution of payo¤s is less likely to be observed in the lab. Deck
and Johnson [8] avoid coordination failures by introducing heterogeneity among
agents and by constructing a framework where the stable network is indeed
unique. Finally, Vanin [25] attempts to facilitate coordination by allowing co-
operation and by preventing renegotiation among (skilled) subjects: he nds
that, even under such favourable conditions, coordination is not achieved in all
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cases.
In this paper we adopt the notion of pairwise stable Nash networks, as in
Goyal and Joshi [15] and we use a framework where any minimally connected
network is a stable architecture according to the theory. This on the one hand
potentially exacerbates the coordination problems due to multiplicity, but on
the other hand mitigates the concerns as in [13] and [3] about the fact that
convergence to the star network is prevented because of fairness considerations.
We run a large scale experiment involving a total of 90 subjects in groups of 6.
Despite the severe multiplicity inherent to the model, we nd some evidence of
convergence to minimally connected networks, very often aided by the focalness
provided by the alphabetical ordering of the subjects labelling. We conrm
these ndings through an econometric analysis at the individual level where we
cannot reject the hypothesis that both best response behaviour and framing
e¤ects (as provided by proximity in the graph and alphabetical order) matters
in determining subjectschoices on link formation.
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 contains the literature review,
both theoretic and experimental. The experimental design is described in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes the paper. The
instructions, both in Italian and in their English translation, can be found in
the appendix. The software utilised for the experiment is available from the
authors upon request.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theory
Seminal papers on the theory of network formation are Jackson and Wolinsky
[19] and Bala and Goyal [1]. The two papers di¤er in the assumption underlying
the process if network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky [19] assume that the
process of network formation is two-sided: it takes two individuals to agree in
order to form a link. Both individuals involved in a social tie bear the cost of
their direct link and they both enjoy the benets that come from it. In Bala and
Goyal [1] the process of network formation is one-sided: players can unilaterally
initiate links to any other player. The cost of the connection is maintained only
by the player who initiates the link. As far as the benets are concerned, Bala
and Goyal distinguish between a one-way ow model and a two-way ow model.
In the former, only the player who initiates the link enjoys the benet from link
formation; in the latter, both players receive the (same) benet from network
formation, even if only one of the two bears the cost.
The main advantage of assuming that links are initiated unilaterally, as in
Bala and Goyal, is that the process of network formation can be formulated as
a non-cooperative game where playersstrategies are given by a tuple of 0s and
1s:
gi =
 
gi;1 gi;2 : : : gi;n 1 gi;n

and the binary variable gi;j 2 f0; 1g represents whether player i is linked to
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player j (gij = 1) or not (gij = 0). In a static setting, an appropriate solution
concept for this game is the Nash equilibrium: a Nash network is the graph
induced by a strategy prole such that each playersstrategy is a best response
to all other playersstrategies.
The main advantage of the Jackson and Wolinksys approach is that it cap-
tures the idea - which is realistic in many economic applications - that both
agents have to agree in order for a link to be formed (and for information to be
exchanged). A clear implication of this approach is that the process of network
formation cannot be modelled as a purely non-cooperative game and the Nash
equilibrium is no longer an appropriate solution concept. Jackson and Wolinsky
introduce the notion of pairwise stability: a pairwise stable network is such that
every link in the network is mutually agreed by the two agents involved and
such that there is no other potential link that any two players would both agree
to form. Unlike a Nash network, a pairwise stable network is robust to some,
but not all, unilateral deviations (a single player is not allowed to delete more
links at once, for example, nor to delete one link and at the same time initiate
a new link with another player); on the other hand, a pairwise stable network
is also robust to deviations which are not unilateral, in that they involve two
players coming together to form a new link1 .
In more recent work Goyal and Joshi [15] have adopted an intermediate
approach, by borrowing the notion of pairwise stability as a renement of a
Nash equilibrium. They consider a non-cooperative game, where playersstrate-
gies are vectors of intended links. As Bala and Goyal and unlike Jackson and
Wolinksy, they allow for any unilateral deviation, so that each player can revise
his vector of intended links in more than one entry at a time. As Jackson and
Wolinksy and unlike Bala and Goyal, they assume that a link between any two
players is formed if and only if both players agree on forming that link. Goyal
and Joshi call a pairwise stable Nash network a Nash network that has the ad-
ditional property that there is no potential link between any two players that
are not connected, that both players would like to initiate.
Despite the di¤erent assumptions on the process of network formation, the
models that the literature has proposed for two-way information ow predict
very similar stable network architectures. When the cost of direct links is su¢ -
ciently high, there are no incentives to network formation and the equilibrium
network is empty. When the cost of maintaining a link is such that network for-
mation is protable, the equilibrium network is minimally connected, i.e. there
is one and only one path that connects any two individuals. An example of
minimally connected network is the star: there is a central agent (the hub) who
is connected to any other agent in the population (the spokes) and there is no
other link.
If there is no decay in the quality of information as it ows through the
graph, a minimally connected network is clearly a rather e¢ cient way of organ-
ising information transmission: there are no redundant links. However there is a
1However more complicated multilateral deviations are not taken into account, so that the
pairwise stability approach is indeed intermediate between cooperative and non-cooperative
game theory.
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tension between stability and e¢ ciency. Link formation involves positive exter-
nalities: by linking to others, each agent also increases the payo¤ of his existing
neighbours. As a result, underconnectedness might arise in equilibrium: there
are levels of cost and benets of link formation, such that the network that max-
imises aggregate value is minimally connected, but the only equilibrium network
is the empty graph.
2.2 Experiments
Extensive literature exists on experiments that aim at testing individual behav-
iour for subjects who interact according to exogenously given networks. For a
thorough review, see Kosfeld [22].
This paper contributes to the more tight literature on experiments on net-
work formation. Recent economic experiments that examine endogenous net-
work formation are Deck and Johnson [8], Callander and Plott [4], Kosfeld and
Falk [13], Vanin [25], Berninghaus, Ott and Vogt [3], Corbae and Du¤y [6].
Most of these studies build on the theoretical framework provided by Bala
and Goyal [1]. In particular Callander and Plott [4] present an "exploratory"
experiment aimed at discovering the evolution of information networks under
di¤erent treatments. In the rst treatment the experiment involves six subjects
who interact repeatedly for a random number of rounds between 10 and 20.
Each experimental subject can choose to link unilaterally to any of the others
according to the Bala and Goyal [1] one-way ow model, where the circle is the
unique e¢ cient and strict Nash network. The second treatment involves di¤erent
costs for di¤erent subjects leading to a di¤erent prediction for the prevailing
network architecture. They nd that networks often converge to the theoretical
predictions under both treatments. In particular under the rst treatment the
prevailing network is a clockwise focal circle, which could result from both a
best-response behaviour and a simple strategic behaviour based on focalness.
They also detect forward looking behaviour that produces dynamic strategies
where agents appear to "trade o¤ short term prots in order to signal to, and
teach, other agents the strategies required for long term prot maximisation"
([4]).
In this paper we consider a network formation process that di¤ers from [4] in
that we require links to be mutually agreed (and mutually sponsored) by each
pair of agents involved. We also di¤er from [4] in the way in which convergence
is claimed: in the case subjects form the same network for three consecutive
rounds, Callander and Plott assume convergence to that particular network; in
this paper subjects are allowed to change their choices of links in any round
until the end of the session. On the other hand, the experimental design here
is similar to theirs in that we also have 6 subjects by session and we adopt a
random stopping rule (exceeding the 15th round).
Falk and Kosfeld [13] test both the one-way and the two-way ow model by
Bala and Goyal [1], under several treatments. In all treatments they consider
four subjects who decide simultaneously and independently. Their main nding
is that convergence to the strict Nash network is obtained in the one-way ow
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model; however it is never achieved in the two-way ow model. They attribute
this nding to the di¢ culty to coordinate in the two-way ow model, where
the theoretical prediction is a center-sponsored star. Also, they suggest that
fairness considerations might drive the result. In fact if subjects dislike unequal
payo¤s, they might be reluctant to form this kind of network unless some form
of compensation is present.
Berninghaus et al [3] test a modied version of the two-way ow model by
Bala and Goyal [1]. They run an experiment with 6 subjects and 15 rounds per
session. They distinguish between active and passive connections and assume
that each player obtains a benet from his direct active connections and from
all those indirect connections obtained through active links. In this modied
framework the unique strict Nash network is the periphery sponsored star. They
nd a higher convergence rate to the Nash network than Kosfeld and Falk [13]
and attribute this to the fact that the coordination problem is less severe in
their framework and that there is less inequality in the payo¤s of a periphery
sponsored star than in a center sponsored star. They also nd that an important
determinant of network formation is played by agents that behave "inactively":
less active groups earn higher payo¤ than active groups. This is due to the fact
that "rst they stop switching strategies after some rounds elapsed. Second,
they open only few active links and try to x one group member to serve as
the potential center player rather early" (in [3]). Reference points in prots
as benchmark on activity could be also a possible explanation of inactivity
behaviours.
In this paper links are mutually agreed and mutually sponsored, so that
there is less free-riding compared to the framework that both Falk and Kosfeld
and Berninghaus et al. analyse. Moreover the theoretical prediction for our
setup is any minimally connected graph, including - but not exclusively - the
star network. As a result equilibrium payo¤s are less unequal and fairness
considerations should therefore be less important. As in [3] we nd that less
active groups are more likely to converge to a stable graph.
The network formation process in this paper is closer to one adopted by Deck
and Johnson [8], Corbae and Du¤y [6] and Vanin [25], who both test versions
of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky [19], where links have to
be mutually agreed. In particular, Deck and Jonhson [8] introduce the spatial
cost topology of Johnson and Gilles [20] in the connections model by [19], where
players are located on a line and the cost for a direct connection between two
players is increasing in the distance between them. The parametrization that
they adopt is such that there is a unique stable network for each treatment, so
that coordination problems due to multiplicity of equilibria are avoided.
The focus of the paper by Corbae and Du¤y [6] is not primarily on the
network formation game, but rather on the comparison between the behaviour in
a coordination game that subjects play when exogenously matched as opposed to
matched with their endogenously chosen neighbours. The experimental design
for the network formation game is similar to the one adopted here, even if made
slightly less complex by the fact that it is based on groups of 4 rather than 6
participants. Some of their ndings are replicated here: for example we also
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detect some learning in the fact that the ratio between actual and proposed
links is increasing over time. However, given that the focus of their paper is
on a di¤erent issue, they do not proceed to any econometric analysis of the
determinants of individual behaviour.
Finally, Vanin [25] runs a pilot of the experimental test of both the connec-
tions and the co-author model by Jackson and Wolinsky [19], using 4 skilled
graduate students who were allowed to cooperate throughout the experimental
sessions. He observes that even under such favourable conditions, convergence
to the stable network architecture is problematic and is obtained, but not in all
cases.
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment involved 90 rst year Economics and Law students from LUISS
University in Rome. At the beginning of each experimental session, written
instructions were distributed and read aloud by the experimenters. Subjects had
then the opportunity to ask questions about their task in the experiment and
the experimental sessions started only upon reassurance by the experimenters
that both the instructions and the incentive structure had been well understood
by the subjects2 . After each experimental session, we asked for written (and
anonymous) comments and feedback from the experimental subjects. Most of
them gave feedback that suggest that they had fully understood the rules of
the game and had some clear ideas on how to play in order to maximise their
prots.
Subjects were paid immediately and in cash after the experiment, using a
rate of conversion of their prots of 10% of the prots achieved in the overall
session, in Euros.
We run 15 computerised experimental sessions, with 6 participants, each
labelled A, B, C, D, E and F. Each experimental session consisted of a minimum
of 15 rounds. We used a random stopping rule to determine the end of each
session: participants were advised of the minimum number of rounds and that,
after the end of round 15 (and of each rounds after that), a lottery administered
by the computer would decide whether there was going to be another round
or not. The probability of new rounds, after round 15, was xed at 50%. The
lottery was visualised on participantsscreens as two ashing buttons, one red
(with a NO sign) and one green (with a YES sign). At the end of each round,
starting from the end of round 15, the two buttons would ash intermittently:
if this ended with the red button being lit, a message box would signal that the
session was over; if this ended with the green button being lit, a message box
would signal that a new round had started.
In each round participants were given the opportunity to submit a new vector
of intended links OR to maintain the previous one (inactivity was allowed). The
number of links that each participant could suggest had to be less or equal to
the maximum number of links that their current endowment could a¤ord. A
2See the appendix for the instructions in Italian and their English translation.
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message box would advise them whenever the budget constraint was binding.
All relevant parameters (i.e. the initial endowment, the cost of each direct link
and the revenue generated by each node to which the participant is connected
through the realised graph) were equal across all participants. At any time
the screen of each of the participants showed unitary costs and benets to link
formation, current endowment, past wins and losses and current graph of overall
existing links. The screen of experimental subject A is depicted in gure 1.
Figure 1
We run 3 di¤erent treatments, with parameters as follows:
Participants Endowment Cost Revenue
Treatment 1 (sessions 1 - 6) 6 500 90 100
Treatment 2 (sessions 7 - 12) 6 500 120 100
Treatment 3 (sessions 13 - 14) 6 500 220 100
In treatment 1 the budget constraint never binds. In treatments 2 and 3 the
budget constraint binds in the rst round (participants can suggest a maximum
of 4 links and 2 links respectively in treatments 2 and 3), and may clearly bind,
and more severely, at any time in subsequent rounds.
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4 Results
In our analysis of the experimental results we focused on the outcomes of the
rst 15 rounds in each session, even when the random stopping rule adopted
allowed for further rounds. This was done in order to obtain a more meaningful
comparison between the outcomes of alternative sessions.
We distinguish between two di¤erent levels of analysis: macro and micro
aspects. In the macro analysis we mainly look at the overall resulting network
of established links, and at its evolution over time. The number of potential
network congurations with 6 agents is more than one million (1.073.741.824):
in our macro analysis we focus on whether there is any particular network archi-
tecture, among the very many that are possible, that emerges as stable in our
experimental sessions and, if it does, on how it compares with the one predicted
by the theory. When we move to consider the micro aspects we mainly focus on
an analysis of the determinants of individual behaviour regarding the propos-
als of links. In particular we estimate through a probit model the likelihood of
link proposals as a function of both best response determinants and behavioural
(mainly framing) factors.
We know from the theory that a rational (best response) behaviour in this
setting would require individuals to always delete any direct link they may have
with any other subject to whom they are at the same time connected indirectly,
through other subjects. Moreover, under parameter set 1, a best response be-
haviour would require subjects to propose a link to any other individual to
whom they are not (indirectly) connected.
Under parameter sets 2 and 3 the theoretical assumption of myopic behaviour
becomes crucial. The only stable network is the empty graph (with no links ever
being proposed) if agents act myopically. In fact, if the cost of forming a link is
higher than the benets obtained by a single connection, then proposing a link
to an isolated node results in negative prots. If, on the other hand, agents are
forward looking, then they might anticipate that other players might also follow
their lead and form ties: if this happens then by supporting the cost of one or
two direct connections, each of the players might indeed receive the benets that
result from more than two (direct and indirect) connections. Under treatment 2
the minimum number of connections that one needs to achieve in order to nd
it worthwhile to invest in two direct links is three: this yields a strictly positive
prot ( 3  100   2  120 = 60). Under treatment 3 the only possibility of
achieving strictly positive prots is by making 5 connections through a maximum
of 2 links (5  100   2  220 = 60). The star, for example, is not viable under
treatments 2 and 3: the hub would incur in a loss of 100 (600) under treatment
2 (treatment 3). The chain, on the other hand, is viable under both treatments,
with each of the agents making strictly positive prots. However a chain can
only be sustained in equilibrium by players who are su¢ ciently forward looking.
If agents act myopically there would be no incentive for the second and the last
but one agent in the chain to maintain a link respectively to the rst and the last
agent in the chain: if, for example, the second agent in the chain deletes his link
to the rst agent, his payo¤ increases from 500  240 = 260 to 400  120 = 280
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under treatment 2 and from 500 440 = 60 to 400 220 = 180 under treatment 3.
If agents are forward looking, then in an innitely repeated game (here the game
is nite, but agents are uncertain about the terminal date), the chain might be
stable. Under treatment 2, the second player in the chain will know that if he
deviates in any particular round, he increases his payo¤ by 20 (from 260 to 280),
but then faces a payo¤ of zero for the rest of the (uncertain) duration of the
game. Deviating will not be protable for su¢ ciently forward looking players.
Under treatment 3, the stability of the chain is more problematic: the increase
in the payo¤ from deviating is in fact very high. Only extremely patient players
would not deviate under treatment 3.
4.1 Macro Aspects
Tables 1a and 1b show the number of proposals between any two experimental
subjects in each of the sessions and over the 15 rounds. Table 2 shows the
average number of proposals in each session: on average experimental subjects
have made 2.64 proposals per round in sessions 1-6 and 2.33 proposals per round
in sessions 7-123 . The lower number of proposals in sessions 7-12 is certainly
due to the fact that direct links are more expensive under the second parameter
set.
Table 1a - Number of proposals of i to j
3The data for the control sessions 13-15 are omitted here because not particularly mean-
ingful. In each of the control sessions under treatment 3 very few proposals were made and
only in the rst few rounds. No proposals were made at all in the later rounds of each session.
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Tab 1b - Number of proposals from i to j
Tab 2 - Average number of proposals
per session
Table 3 shows the total number of established links (matched proposals) per
experimental session. The average number of links in sessions 1-6 was 69.67, or
4.64 links per round; the average number of links in sessions 7-12 was 71.67, or
4.78 links per round; the average number of links in the control sessions 13-15
is 14, i.e. 0.93 per round. As expected, there is very little link formation in
the control sessions. Moreover, interestingly, the average number of established
links under treatment 2 is not signicantly di¤erent from the average number
of established links under treatment 1 (in fact, if anything, the former is higher
than the latter).
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Table 3 - Number of links by session.
In table 4 we show the number of direct links and total connections (both
direct and indirect links) achieved by each of the experimental subjects in each of
the sessions4 , on average; we also compute the ratio between total connections
and direct links. Such a ratio captures an important feature of the network
architecture: the larger its value, the larger the number of the agents that the
experimental subject has managed to reach indirectly. The smallest value for
this ratio is 1 (no other agent is accessed indirectly: the subject has to bear
the entire cost of his/her connections); the largest value for this ratio is 5 (the
subject is connected to the ve others, through a single direct link).
In sessions 1-6 we nd that on average each subject has established 3.3
connections through 1.53 direct links: as a result, for each (costly) direct link,
subjects have enjoyed the benets of 2.16 connections on average. The statistics
are very similar for sessions 7-12.
As an example of treatment 1 (sessions 1-6), we show below the macro
outcome of experimental session 3. The graph presented for each round displays
the actual links formed and it is the same diagram that experimental subjects
would have seen on their screens, before making their decision on proposals of
links for the following round. We notice that there is a tendency to establish
a minimally connected graph. This typically occurs through the formation of
repeated links. For example the link between C and F is always active (for 15
rounds). Also, the links between C and B, D and E, and E and F are very
frequent (respectively for 14, 9 and 10 rounds).
4The data for the control sessions is omitted here, but is not particularly meaningful.
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Table 4 - Direct and indirect connections
In all sessions under treatment 1 we do not nd a denite convergence to
a minimal architecture, however the number of isolated nodes and redundant
links is generally quite small. For example, in session 3, in rounds 3, 4, 6, 9,
10, 11, 13 and 14 the resulting graph is connected, with no agent excluded from
the network of links. In rounds 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 14 and 15 the resulting graph
has no redundant links: i.e. any two agents who are connected are reached
through a single path. Finally in rounds 3, 6, 11 and 14 the resulting graph is
minimally connected and hence it corresponds to a Nash network as predicted
by the theory. The star architecture (the only strict Nash network) is never
reached. However in rounds 2, 6 and 11 the resulting graph is quite close to a
star.
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Session 3, round 1 Session 3, round 2 Session 3, round 3
Session 3, round 4 Session 3, round 5 Session 3, round 6
Session 3, round 7 Session 3, round 8 Session 3, round 9
Session 3, round 10 Session 3, round 11 Session 3, round 12
14
Session 3, round 13 Session 3, round 14 Session 3, round 15
As an example of treatment 2, we show below the network formation process
for session 10. A theory of myopic network formation would have predicted
an empty graph: the cost of a direct link is higher than the benets which
are obtained from a single connection. Hence starting from a situation of no
connections at all (an empty graph), individuals should simply not propose to
form any new link. That is, unless they are forward looking and anticipate that
others will attempt to link up as well. Session 10 showed as an example here
is rather typical of treatment 2 in that all experimental subjects show clear
forward looking behaviour.
We believe that this result is reinforced by what we observed under treatment
3. The parameter set for treatment 3 is such that the only network compati-
ble with individual rationality is an empty graph. Through these sessions we
wanted to lter away any activity between experimental subjects that was driven
merely by the desire to participate in the game and take some action during the
experiment. Sessions 13-15 conrm that the network formation activity under
treatment 2 is indeed driven by forward looking behaviour, and not by the fact
that experimental subjects cannot resist the temptation to input data and gen-
erate some activity. Through the control parameter set we nd that when the
incentives are such that link formation is too costly, even for forward looking
players, there is indeed a very quick convergence to no activity at all and to an
empty graph.
As far as convergence to a stable minimally connected graph is concerned,
under treatment 2 the outcome is marginally better than under treatment 1. In
particular, under treatment 2, there is some evidence of the fact that players
tried to coordinate themselves along a line.
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Session 10, round 1 Session 10, round 2 Session 10, round 3
Session 10, round 4 Session 10, round 5 Session 10, round 6
Session 10, round 7 Session 10, round 8 Session 10, round 9
Session 10, round 10 Session 10, round 11 Session 10, round 12
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Session 10, round 13 Session 10, round 14 Session 10, round 15
We believe that convergence to a minimally connected graph is made very
di¢ cult by two main factors. First of all, as it has been often remarked above,
the game that agents play has multiple equilibria and players nd it very dif-
cult to coordinate on the same Nash equilibrium (clearly communication was
prevented during the experiment). Secondly, subjects display some aversion to
inertia and, whenever a minimally connected graph is reached in early rounds,
it is often later abandoned (in same cases to be reached again) by subjects who
cannot resist to experiment new strategies.
Whenever coordination - and hence convergence - is achieved, this is often on
a focal network. One coordination device that was available to the experimental
subjects is the alphabetical order. In the next section we show how this has in
fact played an important role in determining individual link proposals. We
speculate that other framing e¤ects, such as proximity, also played a role here.
4.2 Micro aspects
We move next to a micro analysis of the determinants of individual behaviour
in link formation. Such an analysis is particularly valid in this context where
because of coordination problems, macro convergence is di¢ cult to observe. In
fact, even in presence of mis-coordination, we still ought to be able to determine
whether at the individual level subjects are behaving as the theory predicts and
what are he main drives to link formation.
We estimate through a probit model the probability of each subject i propos-
ing a link to each other subject j. We treat proposals as independent and this
allows us to estimate our model over 6300 observations across the three di¤er-
ent parametric treatments. We estimate the probability of proposing a link as
a function of: total revenues obtained and total costs incurred in the previous
round by the proponent; and number of links of the recipient. Moreover we in-
clude as regressors several binary variables that denote whether the proponent
and recipient were already linked in the previous round; whether proponent
and recipient were indirectly linked through other agents in the previous round;
whether proponent and recipient are close in alphabetical order or face each
other in the diagram (so that the link appears as a vertical or horizontal line).
Finally dummy variables for the di¤erent parametric treatments. The results of
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our estimates are in table 5.
Total revenues obtained and total costs incurred in the previous round by
the proponent capture both the budget that each subject has available to spend
in new links and the success of past attempts to link up. In fact total prots are
a direct function of direct and indirect connections e¤ectively established in the
previous round. We nd that total revenues are signicant and with a negative
sign: subjects who scored low revenues in the past are more likely to propose
new links. We interpret this nding as a way of catching up on prots. Strategic
uncertainty implies that subjects do not know how many of their proposals will
be reciprocated; if they have not been successful at establishing links in the
past, they ensure themselves by proposing a larger number of new links.
Rationality requires agents to respond to the present network by establishing
direct links to those who have a larger number of connections and never to
propose a direct link to those that they can otherwise reach through indirect
connections. Our estimates show that the likelihood of proposing a link is not
signicantly a¤ected by the number of links of the recipient in the previous
round. Moreover we nd only mildly signicant evidence (p-value 0:17) of the
fact that those agents who have no links (i.e. are isolated) in the previous round
are less likely to be the recipients of a link proposal. On the other hand, we
nd strong evidence of the fact that whenever the proponent and the recipient
are indirectly linked in the previous round, a link proposal is much less likely.
Hence costly link formation is indeed directed to increase the prots that accrue
to agents when they establish connections to those nodes that they are not
able to reach otherwise. These ndings show that experimental subjects have
become aware of the presence of externalities in link formation and have, to an
extent, considered the position of every other agent in the network, as one of
the determinants of their choice. Given that what distinguishes a network from
a series of bilateral interactions is the role played by indirect connections, we
consider this nding as particularly interesting.
Other determinants of link formation do not have a clear theoretical coun-
terpart, at least not within a static network formation game. Other signicant
determinant in the probability of proposing a link are: past play and framing
e¤ects (in particular, alphabetical proximity). We nd strong positive evidence
of the fact that links established in the past are more likely to be conrmed.
Habit has an important role in determining how a network is formed. This is
particularly understandable in a framework where there is strategic uncertainty
about which link proposals will be reciprocated so that the proposed links will
actually be formed.
Similarly we nd that proximity matters and is a clear drive to link forma-
tion: subjects are more likely to propose a link to those who are close to them
in alphabetical order which, in our framework also coincides with physical prox-
imity in the diagram that subjects observe on their screens (but not necessarily
physical proximity in the lab). On the contrary, we nd no evidence of the fact
that proposals that would result in links between subjects that face each other
in the diagram (such as: A and D, E and C, F and B) are more likely. These
ndings seem to conrm that the alphabetical ordering provided subjects with
18
a coordination device. The network formation game that we analyse has multi-
ple equilibria. Hence, in absence of information about the other playersmoves
and of a clear coordination device, it would have been unlikely to observe equi-
librium behaviour. In Deck and Johnson [8] a spatial structure is introduced
where further away agents are more costly to connect to, precisely to reduce
the coordination problem facing agents and "a¤ording a greater likelihood that
the desired architecture is formed" (p. 361, [8]). Our results show that, even in
absence of a cost topology and hence among identical agents, proximity acts as
a coordination device and is relevant in reducing the ambiguity and in limiting
the number of equilibria that may arise.
Finally, as expected, we nd solid evidence of the fact that link proposals are
more likely when the cost of direct links is lower. The probability that an agent
might propose a link is lower in treatment 2 (and even more so in treatment 3)
than in treatment 1.
Table 5 - Probit model
In the feedback forms distributed to experimental subjects at the end of each
session, most of them described the strategy that they had adopted during the
experiment in terms that are easy to relate to one of the determinants outlined
above. In particular many of them reported to have tried to: establish repeated
links; link up with those with many links; propose many links if they were
isolated in the previous round. We also found evidence of the fact that many
proposed links to their neighbours" both in an alphabetical and visual sense.
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4.3 Dynamic Aspects
We next turn to analyse some dynamic aspects, with the aim of detecting the
extent of learning taking place. In table 6 we look at the ratio between accepted
and proposed links over rounds in each session. What we typically observe is that
subjects learn over time who are the players that are more likely to reciprocate
their proposals. The ratio between accepted and proposed links declines over
time. In gure 2 we display the ratio of accepted to proposed links for an average
subject over time. In sessions 1-6 it increases from 0.36 to 0.63; in sessions 7-12
the ratio is uniformly higher and increases from 0.58 to 0.75. This shows that
over time there is a smaller number of proposals which are not reciprocated.
Moreover the e¤ect is stronger under treatment 2, when the cost of links is
higher.
Table 6 - Ratio of accepted to proposed links by session and round.
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Figure 2
We also look at the number of isolated nodes over time, in table 7. It is
decreasing on average: from 2.83 to 0.67 for sessions 1-6 and from 1 to 0.50
for sessions 7-12. On average there was just below one isolated node (0.91)
per round in sessions 1-6; and 0.53 isolated nodes per round in sessions 7-12.
Optimality requires all agents to be connected: these results show that fewer
and fewer agents remain isolated as interaction is repeated over time and that
the learning e¤ect is stronger under treatment 2 than under treatment 1. Again,
a higher cost of link formation helps towards optimality. The diagram in gure
3 summarises this information.
Table 7 - Number of isolated nodes by session and round.
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Figure 3
Finally we look at the number of redundant links over time (table 8). These
are links that rational players should delete: a redundant link is present when
a player is connected to another one both directly and indirectly. Since direct
links come at a cost, it would be optimal to delete all those links to players that
can be reached indirectly through other nodes. On average there was less than
a redundant link per round both under treatment 1 (0.67) and under treatment
2 (0.59): agents are clearly more parsimonious when the cost of link formation
is higher. Figure 4 depicts the number of redundant links over rounds. We
expected that learning would have helped to reduce the number of redundant
links over time, however we did not nd such evidence. We explain this with
lack of coordination. Subjects are uncertain about what the other players will
do and insure themselves against remaining isolated by overconnecting. This
e¤ect is particularly strong within this parameter set where the cost of forming
a link is not too high and in any case is lower than the benet from a direct
connection. This implies that by overconnecting a subject incurs lower prots,
but never losses.
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Table 8 - Number of redundant links by session and round.
Figure 4
4.4 Earnings
Table 9 shows total revenues, costs and prots scored by the experimental sub-
jects in each of the sessions. It is meaningful to compare these values to the
maximum obtainable prots under each of the two treatments. In each of the
rounds in sessions 1-6 the highest obtainable prot corresponds to the situa-
tion whereby an agent is connected to all other ve (hence scoring a revenue of
500) through a single direct link. Hence in sessions 1-6 the maximum obtainable
prot is 6650 (including the initial endowment of 500). The average actual prot
over sessions 1-6 was 3442, equal to approximately 52% of the potential. Under
treatment 2, the maximum obtainable prot is 6200 (i.e. 380 x 15 + 500). The
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average actual prot over sessions 7-12 was 2879, equal to approximately 46%
of the potential.
Table 9 - Earnings.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we explore the network formation behaviour in a laboratory exper-
iment. Interesting insights stem from both a micro and a macro level analysis.
From a micro perspective, we nd that agents are forward looking and clearly
follow complex dynamic strategies where they trade o¤ short term losses in or-
der to signal to the other participants their intention to follow strategies that
will ensure long term prots. We detect three main drives to link formation:
best-response behaviour, focalness and habit. As best-response behaviour would
predict, subjects are less likely to propose links to those who have no links them-
selves; also, subjects are less likely to propose a direct link to those to whom
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they are already indirectly connected. Focalness has a role because when choos-
ing whom to link to, subjects display a preference for their neighbours, both
in an alphabetical sense and in a graphical sense. As a result the alphabetical
order provides agents with a coordination device that allows them to focalise on
the same stable network. Finally, habit plays an important role: subjects are
more likely to propose a link to those with whom they have already successfully
established links in the past.
From a macro perspective, our main nding is that, despite the multiplicity
of equilibria, subjects often succeed in identifying a focal stable network to
converge to. We believe that this positive result is due to two main factors.
First, in our experimental setting we require links to be mutually agreed and
mutually sponsored. This has the important implication that the star is not
the unique stable network architecture, but any minimally connected graph
is stable. Moreover, given that both agents involved in a link have to bear
the cost of the connection, there is less free riding here than in the typical
institutional setup that most of the literature has so far considered. This greatly
alleviates the concerns raised by some authors that it is very di¢ cult to obtain
convergence to a network that is not fairness compatible in the sense that payo¤s
are unequally distributed. A second factor that helps towards convergence is the
focalness provided by the alphabetical ordering. We nd that proximity matters
in network formation even when it is not reected in the cost parametrization
(as it occurs in [8], where connecting to neighbours is cheaper than linking to
those who are further away).
The most commonly observed deviations from stable networks are: overcon-
nectedness and the fact that minimally connected graph reached earlier on in
the session are later departed from. A possible explanation for overconnected-
ness is that, due to multiplicity of equilibria, subjects try to cope with strategic
uncertainty by forming redundant links as a form of insurance. Some aversion
to inertia may explain the latter phenomenon. Both explanations are consistent
with the fact that convergence and e¢ ciency are higher in the second treatment,
where direct links are more expensive. Moreover, both explanations can be rec-
onciled with the learning behaviour detected over time: both redundant links
and isolation tend to decrease during the course of the sessions.
The results of our analysis suggest some directions for future research. It
would be interesting to see what is the e¤ect of providing subjects with ad-
ditional information. In this paper subjects are not aware about unmatched
proposals; by disclosing information on past willingness to link may help to-
wards convergence. The important role played by focalness suggests that it
should be ascertained further whether it is the alphabetical order or proximity
that matters. If it is proximity, as we suspect, then it would be interesting to
assess whether proximity in characteristics also matters. Therefore heterogene-
ity in costs, benets and endowments could be used to detect whether agents
sort according to similarity or diversity.
25
References
[1] Bala,V. and Goyal,S. (2000), "A non-cooperative model of network forma-
tion", Econometrica, 68, 1181-1229.
[2] Bandiera, O. and I. Rasul (2002): Social Networks and Technology Adop-
tion in Northern Mozambique, Working Paper, STICERD, London School
of Economics. UK.
[3] Berninghaus, S. K. Ott M. and Vogt B. (2004), "On networks and stars-
Recent result in network experiments", Working Paper.
[4] Callander, S. and Plott, C. (2005), "Principles of Network Development
and Evolution: An experimental study", Journal of Public Economics 89,
1469-1495.
[5] Conley, T. and C. Udry.(2002): Learning about New Technology: Pineap-
ple in Ghana, Working Paper, Yale University.
[6] Corbae, D. and Du¤y,J. (2003), "Experiments with network formation",
mimeo, University of Pittsburg.
[7] Cremerer J., Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (2000), "Connectivity in the Commercial
Internet", Journal of Industrial Economics 48, 433-472.
[8] Deck, C. and Johnson, C. (2004), "Link bidding in laboratory network",
Review of Economic Design, 8, 359-372.
[9] De Weerdt, J.(2002): Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation,
Discussion Paper 2002/57, WIDER, Helsinki.
[10] Fafchamps, M. and S. Lund (2003): Risk Sharing Networks in Rural
Philippines, Journal of Development Economics 71, pp. 261-287.
[11] Fafchamps, M. (2002): Social Capital and Development, paper presented
at the GPRG Meeting held in Oxford on October 10-11, 2002
[12] Fafchamps, M., and B. Minten (2002): Returns to Social Network Capital
Among Traders, Oxford Economic Papers 54, pp. 173-206.
[13] Falk, A. and Kosfeld, M. (2003), "Its all about connections:Evidence on
network formation", IEW Working Paper No.21, University of Zurich.
[14] Farrell, J and Saloner, G., (1985), "Standardization, Complexity, and In-
novation", Rand Journal of Economics 16, 70-83.
[15] Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2004), "Unequal connections", mimeo.
[16] Grimard, F. (1997): Household Consumption Smoothing through Ethnic
ties: Evidence from Côte dIvoireJournal of Development Economics, vol.
53, pp. 391-422.
26
[17] Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995), "The Economics of Hubs: The case of
Monopoly", Review of Economic Studies, 62, 83-99.
[18] Hendrichs, Piccione and Tan (1999)," Equilibria in Networks" Economet-
rica, 67, 1407-1434.
[19] Jackson, M.O. and Wolinsky, A. (1996), "A strategic model of social and
economic networks", Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44-74.
[20] Johnson, C.A. and Gilles, G.P. (2000), "Spatial social networks", Review
of Economic Design, 5, 273-299.
[21] Katz , M.and Shapiro, C.,(1985), "Network Externalities, Competition and
Compatibility", American Economic Review 75, 424-440.
[22] Kostfeld, M. (2004), "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey",
Review of Network Economics 3, 20-41.
[23] Krishnan, P. and Sciubba, E. (2004), "Endogenous Network Formation and
Informal Institutions in Village Economies", Cambridge Working Paper in
Economics n. 462.
[24] La¤ont, J. Rey, P. and Tirole J. (1998), "Network Competition: I Overview
and Nondiscriminatory Pricing, RAND Journal of Economics 29, 1-37.
[25] Vanin, P. (2002), "Network Formation in the Lab: A Pilot Experiment",
mimeo, University Pompeu Fabra.
27
Appendix: Instructions (English Translation)
Welcome.
This is an experiment on the formation of links among di¤erent subjects. If
you make good choices you can earn money that will be paid to you in cash
immediately at the end of the experiment.
You are one of the 6 participants in this experiment; at the beginning of the
experiment the computer will randomly assign to you a label (A, B, C, D, E, or
F) and an intial budget (that same for all). You will nd your label denoted in
red on your screen.
The experiment will last a random number of rounds: there will be at least
15 rounds and, after the 15th, a lottery will be administered by the computer
in order to determine if the experiment will nish at that round or continue.
Each participant to the experiment represents a node. At the beginning of
the experiment all nodes will be isolated. In each round you will be asked by the
computer if you want to make some connections with the other participants and
with whom. You will have the possibility to initiate one, two or more links The
computer will receive all participantsproposals and will activate only the links
that are mutually agreed. The graph of established connections will appear on
your screen.
Each e¤ective link has a cost (equal for all participants) which will reported
on your screen. In each round the computer will refuse your linksproposals
if the expenditure required for the links that your propose, when activated, is
greater than the budget that you have available to spend for that round.
In each round the compute will calculate your revenues as the product be-
tween the unitary revenue (equal for all nodes and shown on your screen) and
the number of nodes that you will be able to reach both through your own and
other participantsconnections.
For example, as you can see in the diagram below, subject B is directly
linked to D and C and indirectly, that is through C, to F.
In each round the computer will calculate your prot and will display it on
your screen. The overall prot from the experiment is given by the sum of your
revenues in all rounds. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash
an amount equivalent to the 10% of your total prot.
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More in detail
At the beginning of the experiment please wait for instructions from the
experimenters without touching any key.
When the experimenter will ask you to do so, please double-click only once
on the "Link to Student" icon on your desktop.
The following screen will appear:
On this screen the rst line indicates information relevant to the round you
are playing.
Be careful: every round will last at most a number of seconds as indicated
in red in the rst line on the screen. If you fail to make any choice before the
given time, the computer will move you automatically to the next round.
The table will show the results you scored in each round. At the end of each
round, the diagram will show the links that you and other participants have
successfully established.
When the key "Start Round" is active, you can start to play.
Press "Start Round" and make your choice. When you are done, press "Stop
Round". The computer automatically calculates on shows on the scree the result
of your choice.
The last line on the screen shows messages that are relevant to your session.
At the end of each round, the computer will initiate a new round and the
key "Start Round" will become active again. Be careful: after the 15th round,
your screen will show two ashing lights. If they stop on green, you will have
the chance to play another round; it they stop on red the experiment is over.
It is very important that you make choices independently and that you do
not communicate with other participants during the experimental session.
For any problem, please contact the experimenters.
Have a good session.
April 2004.
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